I believe ("I choose?") that I have free will, at least in some measure, and moral responsibility.
I presume that this focused form of consciousness has come about through, or been tapped into by, evolution. I thus assume that a bug is less conscious (at least in the same way that I am conscious) than I, and a stone less still. It seems strange to me that I am conscious if I have no free will. If I cannot choose, then why woud nature bother with the feeling of being somewhere and doing something and choosing to do another thing? Less overhead to do without it!
In any case, either I have free will or I do not. The same goes for moral responsibility.
- If I have free will and moral responsibility, then I have chosen correctly and merit praise.
- If I have free will and do not have moral responsibility, then I have chosen correctly... which is nice, one supposes, but of no special importance since choosing correctly is of no higher worth than choosing incorrectly.
- If I have neither free will nor moral responsibility, then I have chosen incorrectly, but I could have done no differently and it doesn't matter anyway.
- If I have not free will but do have moral responsibility, then I have chosen incorrectly, and this is, presumably wrong... but I could have done no differently and besides, morality without free will is silly.
Perhaps you ask: why do you assume beliveing correct things is of moral worth?
If you go with the European tradition, then that's what philosophy is all about. If it's not, then why are you reading this since it doesn't matter?
If you go with the Chinese tradition, you should stop asking stupid questions.